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The most famous article on child-custody law, and one of the most 
important in family law scholarship altogether, is Robert H. Mnookin’s Child 
Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 
published in Law and Contemporary Problems in 1975.1 In that article, 
Professor Mnookin analyzed the best-interests-of-the-child standard, which by 
the 1970s had emerged as the dominant custody decision rule.2 Although the 
best-interests standard seemed on its face to be an uncomplicated and 
straightforward way to put the interests of children first in custody 
decisionmaking, Professor Mnookin explained its distinctive character and 
deficiencies as a legal rule.3 His two core themes were the indeterminacy of the 
best-interests standard and the differences between private custody disputes 
and those in which the state seeks to take custody of a child from a parent.4 The 
goal of this issue of Law and Contemporary Problems is to examine the impact 
of Professor Mnookin’s framework and insights and to analyze developments in 
legal and social-science research and in practice since his article imposed 
conceptual order on the field. 
Professor Mnookin’s custody article is so familiar to scholars in the field that 
it need not be described in detail, but its most important contributions warrant 
a brief summary. First, the article explained how child-custody adjudication 
under the best-interests standard differs from adjudication in other legal 
contexts.5 In the standard legal proceeding, judges apply the law by evaluating 
factual evidence of past acts. In applying the best-interests standard, judges 
evaluate the parents as persons and make predictions about how each proposed 
custodial arrangement will affect the child’s future welfare. One problem, 
Mnookin explained, is that current knowledge of human behavior is not 
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adequate to equip courts to make accurate predictions about various outcomes.6 
Just as importantly, no social consensus exists about the values that should 
determine which outcomes in fact serve the child’s best interests. Mnookin 
famously described the challenge, “Deciding what is best for a child poses a 
question no less ultimate than the purposes and values of life itself.”7 In the 
absence of either reliable predictive tools or a social consensus about what is 
good for children, Mnookin argued, the best-interests standard in fact does not 
provide meaningful guidance, thereby leaving judges to decide cases in 
accordance with their own instincts and values.8 
After exposing the vast indeterminacy of the best-interests standard, 
Professor Mnookin explored the implications of this analysis in different 
categories of disputes. He identified two very different judicial functions in the 
adjudication of child-custody cases—child protection and private dispute 
resolution—and argued that they must be distinguished and subject to different 
legal standards.9 On both pragmatic and philosophical grounds, Mnookin 
argued that when the state intervenes to remove a child from parental custody, 
decisions should not be based on the discretionary best-interests standard. 
Instead he proposed a narrow standard that requires proof by the government 
of actual harm to the child of continued parental custody.10 
In the context of private dispute resolution, Professor Mnookin ultimately 
concluded that no superior alternative to the best-interests standard is 
available—despite his devastating critique of its indeterminacy.11 To bring some 
degree of determinacy to these disputes, he recommended what he called 
“intermediate rules,”12 which include a preference for awarding custody to an 
adult who is the child’s psychological parent over one who is a stranger to the 
child, and a preference for biological or “natural” parents over other adults, so 
long as the biological parent also has a psychological bond to the child.13 
Although Mnookin acknowledged that his intermediate rules resolve few cases, 
he concluded that no more determinate general custody rule, based on gender 
or wealth, for example, is satisfactory. Given the inadequacy of the legal 
standard, Mnookin advocated for nonjudicial resolution of most custody 
disputes through negotiation or mediation, dispute-resolution processes that 
were in its infancy in the mid-1970s.14 
As the articles in this issue indicate, custody law and practice have evolved 
over the past forty years; this evolution reflects the significance of Mnookin’s 
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early work and its enduring influence. Both substantively and procedurally, law 
and policy have internalized the differences between the child-protection and 
private-dispute-resolution functions. In the child-protection context, standards 
for intervening into families to protect children have tightened, both statutorily 
at the state and federal level, and as a matter of constitutional doctrine. Less 
change is evident in the private-custody context. However, scholars have 
proposed, and some legislatures have experimented with, alternatives to the 
best-interests standard that are motivated, in part at least, by Professor 
Mnookin’s indeterminacy critique. In addition, methods of alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) to resolve custody disputes have expanded dramatically and 
other reforms to enhance parental agreement, such as parenting-plan 
requirements, demonstrate the acceptance of Professor Mnookin’s confidence, 
as a general matter, in the superiority of private ordering over adjudication. 
The issue of Law and Contemporary Problems brings together leading legal 
scholars and social scientists who study child custody in both the private-
dispute-resolution and child-welfare contexts. The variety of their contributions 
reflect the enduring relevance of Professor Mnookin’s work. Professor Emily 
Buss carefully traces the substantial evolution of constitutional law relating to 
child custody, concluding that the increasing recognition of parental rights over 
the years has been responsive to some of Mnookin’s concern for the 
indeterminacy of the best-interests standard.15 Carefully distinguishing the 
principle that the law should serve the best interests of children from the best-
interests implementation rule—a distinction accepted by Professor Mnookin 
and by all the participants in this issue—Buss argues that the respect for the 
rights of parents mandated by the Constitution provides the best doctrinal 
foundation for serving the children’s interests in both the child welfare and 
private dispute contexts.16 
Working within those constitutional limits, Professor Katharine T. Bartlett 
and Professors Elizabeth S. Scott and Robert E. Emery challenge Professor 
Mnookin’s reluctant conclusion that, for resolving private custody disputes, no 
better alternative to the best-interests standard is available.17 They argue on 
behalf of a custody rule that uses the proportion of time each parent spent 
caring for the child when the parents lived together as a more determinate 
guide for allocating the amount of each parent’s caretaking responsibility when 
the parents separate. The “approximation standard,” initially proposed by 
Professor Scott in 1992 and adopted by the American Law Institute in 2002 as 
the “past caretaking standard,” provides a fact-based focus for custody 
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adjudication that is more predictable and objective than the best-interests 
standard, thus alleviating the many difficulties with the standard that Professor 
Mnookin outlines.18 
In her comprehensive study of the impact of the ALI proposal, Professor 
Bartlett finds that although few jurisdictions have adopted the ALI standard 
per se, past caretaking has become increasingly important in custody decisions 
rules since the new standard was proposed.19 Still, based on her examination of 
the relationship between the decision rule of a jurisdiction and the predictability 
of its case law, Bartlett argues that unless past caretaking is given greater 
priority than most states give it, indeterminacy and subjectivity will continue to 
be major problems in custody adjudication.20 
Given the deficiencies of the best-interests standard as explained by 
Professor Mnookin and other scholars, Elizabeth Scott and Robert Emery 
probe its puzzling persistence as the dominant legal rule.21 Scott and Emery 
argue that the endurance of the best-interests standard is the product of two 
interrelated factors. First, advocates for mothers and fathers have been 
embroiled in a gender war over custody law that has played out in legislatures 
and courts for decades.22 The legislative battle has focused primarily on joint 
custody, which women’s groups have vigorously opposed, and on protections 
from domestic violence, which the same groups have made a high priority.23 
Fathers’ advocates, in turn, have promoted judicial recognition of a 
controversial phenomenon they call the “parental alienation syndrome,” which 
mothers groups have attempted to refute.24 The upshot, Scott and Emery argue, 
has been a political-economy deadlock that has left the best-interests standard 
entrenched as the dominant custody rule.25 
Second, courts routinely rely on mental-health professionals to assist them 
in applying the best-interests standard, a practice that likely has allayed concern 
about the standard’s indeterminacy.26 The problem, Scott and Emery argue 
(with agreement from a number of the other symposium participants), is that 
the child’s best interests are not a matter as to which mental-health 
professionals have the answers.27 The authors suggest that exposing the illusion 
that psychological experts can overcome the problems inherent in best-interests 
determinations is an important step toward reform and better custody 
decisionmaking.28 
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Whether and to what extent more determinate legal standards can 
effectively steer parents toward particular custodial arrangements is the subject 
of an article by Bruce Smyth, Richard Chisholm, Bryan Rodgers, and Vu Son, 
which is based on extensive research on the impact of Australian reforms 
designed to encourage and support shared parenting.29 This empirically rich 
article finds that, notwithstanding these reforms, shared parenting (defined as 
involving children spending at least thirty percent of their time with each 
parent30) has plateaued, both among couples negotiating shared-time 
arrangements (twenty percent or less31) and among shared-time arrangements 
ordered by judges (ten percent or less32). Smyth and his colleagues also find that 
the level of conflict in separated families in Australia has declined, which they 
attribute not to the legal changes favoring shared custody but rather to the 
child-sensitive dispute-resolution processes established in Australia and to the 
greater support that courts and community-based services offer to families 
negotiating their own agreements outside the formal litigation process.33 
Kimberley C. Emery and Robert E. Emery explore further the role of 
mediation and other forms of ADR in the custody context, expanding on 
Professor Mnookin’s proposal that most private custody disputes should be 
resolved outside of court.34 Emery and Emery describe a substantial body of 
research indicating the benefits both to parents and children of ADR, including 
the newer forms such as arbitration, custody evaluation and the use of parental 
coordinators, all of which can assist parents to reach agreement out of court.35 
More provocatively perhaps, they argue that separated and divorced parents 
and their children are similar in their relationships to families based on 
marriage, and that courts should be just as disinclined to intervene in the 
disputes of parents living apart as they are to resolve the disputes of married 
couples.36 They would limit access of parents to litigation and encourage them to 
use ADR to make and enforce their agreements.37 
Jana B. Singer connects some of the legal scholarship and reforms motivated 
by Professor Mnookin’s work relating to substantive custody standards to the 
scholarship and reforms relating to his recommmendations for procedural 
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reforms.38 She reaches two conclusions about the connections between the two. 
First, she maintains that the open-ended, indeterminate best-interests standard 
was itself partially responsible for some of the shift from adversarial to 
nonadversarial dispute resolution.39 Because the results of formal litigation were 
uncertain, she argues that parents turned toward dispute-resolution methods 
that were more interactive and collaborative.40 Second, she argues that the shift 
to nonadversarial dispute resolution, in turn, “de-legalized” or de-emphasized 
the custody standards themselves.41 If parents were to work things out 
themselves, she explains, they could focus more on planning and 
accommodation, rather than decision rules.42 
The vast expansion of ADR options is only one of the transformations 
affecting the legal and social landscape over the past four decades. This period 
has also seen monumental shifts in reproductive technologies, nonmarital 
family units, and gay and lesbian parenting. Nancy D. Polikoff reviews how the 
law has evolved in response to these changes.43 Professor Polikoff argues that 
the dichotomy Mnookin assumed between “natural parents” and “third parties” 
has become obsolete, particularly with respect to gay and lesbian parents.44 
Using cases involving lesbian mothers as her primary focus, she meticulously 
demonstrates how this dichotomy is being replaced by a more functional 
definition of parent, and she argues that individuals who meet this definition 
should be viewed the same as “natural parents,” with all of the same rights and 
responsibilities.45 
The articles in this issue give the greatest amount of attention to private 
child-custody disputes, but the issue also recognizes Professor Mnookin’s 
significant contributions in the child welfare context. As noted above, Emily 
Buss tracks developments in the constitutional law that impose the kinds of 
restraints on state interference in families that Professor Mnookin argued were 
necessary.46 Clare Huntington also notes the profound influence of Professor 
Mnookin’s work in the child-welfare context.47 She argues, however, that 
despite the legal reforms that have occurred in the last forty years—many of 
them embracing Mnookin’s proposals for more determinate standards—most of 
 
 38.  Jana B. Singer, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Best-Interests Standard: The Close Connection 
Between Substance and Process in Resolving Divorce-Related Parenting Disputes, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. 
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the same systemic problems that he noted forty years ago remain.48 Professor 
Huntington emphasizes two specific problems. First, the states and the federal 
government have not invested sufficient resources to develop the programs that 
would actually prevent the need for out-of-home placements.49 Second, 
although more determinate standards of the sort recommended by Professor 
Mnookin have moved children out of foster care more quickly, the shorter time 
frames mean that fewer parents are able to do what is required of them for the 
return of their children.50 Given the shortage of permanent alternatives, what 
this means is that many children never find a permanent home.51 Professor 
Huntington’s analysis suggests that the solution is not new or better legal 
standards, but rather a greater commitment of public resources to prevent the 
necessity of removing children from their parents in the first place.52 
As this issue of Law and Contemporary Problems demonstrates, the 
contributions of Professor Mnookin’s analysis of the best-interests standard, 
and of child custody–dispute resolution, have been remarkably enduring. 
Although the legal and social landscape has shifted in astounding and 
unpredictable ways, Professor Mnookin’s work remains the reference point in 
custody law scholarship and policy discussions—no less today, than over the 
forty years since Law and Contemporary Problems first published his work. The 
special editors, authors, and extraordinarily conscientious and capable editors 
of Law and Contemporary Problems are proud to have been a part of the 
evaluation of this impressive legacy. 
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